When in 1989 political change swept through Central Europe and the communist dominoes fell, Yugoslavia was in a deep economic crisis, aggravated by growing tensions between the six “Socialist Federal Republics,” or rather between the national groups which constituted the Southern Slav State. Many Slovenes and Croats hoped to achieve the loosening of the federal State, some may have dreamt of even planned its dissolution, but outside Yugoslavia practically nobody believed that the days of “the second Yugoslavia” were numbered.
We in Hungary, especially the members and supporters of the Antall-government, which won the free elections in April 1990, were fully aware of the national/ethnic/religious diversity of Yugoslavia, and of the past tensions and conflicts between the Orthodox Christian Serbs and the Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes, but we, too, believed that the communist dictator, Marshal Tito, was successful in containing the traditional antagonisms by the creation of a real federal structure of six “state-forming” republics and a modest form of autonomy within Serbia for Kosovo (inhabited mainly by Albanians) and the Vojvodina, where six nationalities (including close to 400 000 Hungarians) lived side-by-side.
The restoration of political pluralism in the communist bloc did not escape Yugoslavia. In April and May respectively parties committed to national traditions and a weaker union (confederation?) won the free elections in Slovenia and Croatia. Elections were held in Serbia only in December, 1990, and gave a very strong majority (78 per cent) to the Socialist Party, the successor of the former League of Communists, led by Slobodan Milošević. In the rest of Yugoslavia (including the two regions whose autonomy was practically abolished in March, 1989) the autonomist-nationalist (non-Serb) parties proved the most popular. Hungary’s position was ambiguous. From the 11th century until 1918 Croatia was in a dynastic personal union with Hungary, resembling the relationship of Scotland to England. Cultural and religious similarities, plus family ties between the two were complicated by memories of nationalist tensions in the 19th century, ending in divorce at the end of 1918. With the Serbs historical ties were burdened by the memory of several armed conflicts (particularly severe ones in 1848/49), the ill-treatment of Hungarians in the territory assigned to Yugoslavia after World War I, Hungary joining the German aggression against Yugoslavia in April, 1941, atrocities committed by Hungarian officers in 1942 in a town ceded back to Hungary, and the mass-murder of between twenty and forty thousand innocent Hungarians, committed by communist partisans in late 1944. But notwithstanding sympathies and antipathies, Hungary always had to bear in mind that hundreds of thousands of Hungarians lived in the Vojvodina, under the control of Serbia.
Varieties on the future of Yugoslavia
Following the break between Stalin and Tito in 1948 the United States and her allies gave very substantial economic and military support to Yugoslavia – for perfectly understandable reasons. That made Yugoslavia the most prosperous and most open communist country, without giving up the communist utopia and the dictatorship. Tito’s federalism seemed to have quelled the national tensions. A “new class” of former partisans and party apparatchiks (mainly but not exclusively Serbs) controlled the State, and a new “Yugoslav” identity started to gain ground. For decades the West turned a blind eye onto the gross violations of human rights in Yugoslavia, and was apparently unaware of the growing resentment felt by the non-Serbs towards the political and economic domination of the country by Serbs calling themselves Yugoslav internationalist communists. How fair was Tito’s Yugoslavia for the non-Serbs and the national minorities? On paper and in principle quite, but there was increasing discontent on all sides. The Croats and Slovenes, who generated most of the national income, felt they were being robbed of much of their due by the Serbs and the poorer republics, while most Serbs thought that the rights the other republics and autonomous territories enjoyed were too extensive. The Constitution adopted in 1974 even allowed the option of secession to the republics (but not to the autonomous territories). The desire to keep Yugoslavia united (and also memories of Serbia as an ally in two world wars) made most members of NATO very reluctant to accept that the non-Serbs of Yugoslavia had legitimate grievances.
In 1989 the aim of the Serbian leadership appeared to be the preservation of their dominant position and to continue transferring income from the hard-working and relatively affluent western republics to the less affluent ones. In 1990, following the defeat of the communists in the two western republics, Milošević came to the conclusion that the supremacy of the Serbs over the whole country might no longer be maintained, but he was vehemently opposed to the prospect that Serbs would become national minorities in any Southern Slav state. He could accept Slovenia (practically having no Serbian population) becoming independent, but in the case of Croatia world accept only a rump state, which would give up its territories where Serbs, too, were living.1 For several months secret talks, unknown to the outside world, went on among the member republics about creating a new Yugoslavia, perhaps a confederation, with changes in the state borders, keeping all the Serbs together in one State.2
In its foreign policy the new Hungarian government tried to reconcile two aims: cordial relations and close cooperation with all the neighbouring countries, while giving full support to the 2.5 million Hungarians, who had been ill-treated minorities in those States since the Peace Treaty of Trianon signed in 1920. There was a tacit agreement between Prime Minister Antall and myself that relations with our neighbours would be primarily my responsibility. With the goverment just in place, at the end of June 1990, I set out for Belgrade, but on my way I stopped in Novi Sad/Újvidék, the administrative centre of the Vojvodina, where most of the Hungarian institutions were located. In Belgrade, I met both the Federal Prime Minister Marković and Milošević, the strongman. We agreed that the economic ties cut by the world wars should be re-established and the Serbian-Hungarian border should be as open as possible. Then I proceeded to Zagreb, where I reopened the Consulate-General of Hungary, closed since 1941. In the Croatian capital, I found a vigorous atmosphere: determination and optimism that Croatia would be able to advance its position, but none of the leaders I met (President Tudjman, future President Mesić and Foreign Minister Mrsić) spoke about plans to secede.
When in September 1990 we received a request from the Croatian government to sell thirty thousand hand-guns for the police force of Zagreb, we saw no danger. The quantity and type of those arms ruled out any possibility that they could facilitate an armed conflict with Belgrade. Refusal would have scuttled our plans for overcoming the bad memory of the last decades in the common State, and re-establishing the close friendship between the two nations. With the approval of the relevant inter-departmental committee for the export licence two specialized trading companies signed a contract and the first consignment of ten thousand Kalashnikov-type rifles was delivered in October, after proper formalities at the customs. Soon the federal Yugoslav Minister of Defence, Mr. Kadijević, sent a letter to his Hungarian counterpart, inquiring if there had been any sale of weapons by Hungary to Croatia. The letter stated that only the federal authorities in Belgrade were entitled to authorize any procurement of weapons. In order to prevent any complications Hungary then stopped the further delivery of any types of arms to Yugoslavia, and maintained that policy for the duration of the whole conflict.3
Until the end of 1990 hardly anyone in Hungary envisaged the break-up of Yugoslavia. We sympathized with decentralization, with more rights for the republics and the autonomous regions, but the prospect of an independent Serbia, under communist-nationalist leadership, was seen as a grave danger for the large Hungarian population of the Vojvodina.4
The Road to Independence and (Civil?) War
Following the Serbian elections of 9 December tensions increased precipitately. The first acts of violence occurred in the Knin area, where the half million strong Serbian minority of Croatia was concentrated. They opposed the introduction of Croatian national symbols (like the traditional flag) and the assertion of Croatian authority. Following clashes with the Croatian police they proclaimed their “Krajina Serbian Autonomous District” on 21 December, 1990. At the end of 1990 a referendum was held in Slovenia with 88 per cent favouring independence. At the same time Serbia started to finance its economy illegally from the federal Yugoslav National Bank. Slovenia and Croatia retorted by stopping the transfer of hard currency earnings to Belgrade. The collective Presidency of the Federation came to a standstill. It must have been at that point that the Serb leadership in Belgrade decided on a propaganda offensive against Croatia, potentially provoking an armed conflict, with the aim of severing its eastern, partly Serb-inhabited regions. The incident of the Hungarian sale of rifles was a handy pretext. On 26 January Belgrade Television broadcast a doctored film showing Špegelj, the Croatian Minister of Defense, discussing how to smuggle arms to Croatia for launching a war. The added charge was that Hungary openly delivered a large quantity of weapons for that purpose. I naturally denied the allegation. Simultaneously the leadership of the JNA, the Yugoslav People’s Army, on 24 January issued an order of the day read to all units (published on 31 January in two newspapers, Borba and Vjesnik), which sounded almost like a new Communist Manifesto. Starting with a reference to the action of Soviet special police in Vilnius killing several people who demonstrated for independence, the document welcomed that the separatist tendencies in the Soviet Union were met with determined counter-steps and stated that “Socialism in Yugoslavia is not over and has not been overpowered. […] There is a realistic prospect of preserving the country as a federal socialist community.” It continued with an attack on Western “anti-Socialist schemes” and the efforts of the CIA to defeat Communism, and its bastion, Yugoslavia, by breaking it up. According to the statement the main line of attack for that purpose was Hungary, but all the efforts to undermine Yugoslavia (including proposals to change it into a confederation) could be defeated by economic reforms, by the unity and proper financing of the Yugoslav People’s Army, and by rallying behind the new “League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia.” It was said that in the war of 1941–45 the Yugoslav and the socialist idea was victorious: by supporting the new political organization and relying on the young generation that could be repeated.5
While in the following months the confrontations between the Serbs of Croatia in the Knin area grew in intensity resulting in more than a dozen deaths, and Serb paramilitary units eventually cut off Dalmatia from Zagreb, there were intensive and dramatic debates in the federal presidency with the generals of the Serb-led Army participating. The Serb aim was to receive authorization for the Army to declare a state of emergency and to be granted “full war powers”. On 13 March, 1991 the Minister of Defence, Kadijević, and Jović, the Serbian rotating head of the collective presidency, secretly flew to Moscow and met Minister of War Yazov to purchase arms and to coordinate their plans for a military takeover in both countries. An alternative plan, concocted by Milošević and his ally, Jović, and presented to Tudjman on 25 March, was the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between the Serbs and the Croats, leaving the Muslims in the lurch.6 There were many further discussions, still-born plans for saving a semblance of unity, also preparations for a showdown, but western governments took almost no notice of the turmoil and the gathering storm. When, sensing some problems, the troika of the foreign ministers of the European Community visited Belgrade in early April, they met only Federal Prime Minister Marković and Foreign Minister Lončar, and declined to have talks with any of the leaders from the six republics. US Secretary of State James Baker declared on 21 June in Belgrade that Yugoslavia must remain a unitary state. The wake-up call for the world was the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June, 1991. Two days later, the Yugoslav Army moved into Slovenia, first of all to take over the control of the borders. To everybody’s surprise the Slovenian territorial defence forces resisted successfully, many of the Yugoslav units were surrounded and isolated. The EC troika flew to Belgrade and then to Zagreb, with the proposal to “suspend” the execution of the declarations of independence while a new arrangement for Yugoslavia was being worked out. An agreement on that was signed on 8 July on the Island of Brioni.
Hungarian efforts for peace
Prime Minister Antall, myself as his Foreign Minister and Defence Minister Lajos Für were all professional historians, who knew from the history of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy both the difficulties of running and preserving multi-national states, and the painful consequences of break-up. We took the principle of self-determination seriously, we were aware of the political and cultural differences between the nations of Yugoslavia and their conflicting interests, but believed that a confederation might be a good compromise: full internal independence but common economic space, currency, customs, and freedom to choose how far to coordinate foreign and defence policy. Antall and his government felt a deep responsibility towards the Hungarians of Yugoslavia.
We could not refuse sympathy for two old neighbours, the Croats and Slovenes, who shared so much with us in history, neither could we risk confrontation with Serbia, who held 400 000 Hungarians in the position of hostage.
Already before the declarations of independence we warned our Western friends about the danger of an armed conflict and proposed an international conference on Yugoslavia’s future. Following the military action in Slovenia the Hungarian Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling on the parties to refrain from using force. It continued: “We are convinced that the solution of the crisis can only be based on the ten basic principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, and the agreements adopted in Berlin at the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. […] We stress that we are interested in seeing a peaceful, negotiated agreement on Yugoslavia’s future which is based on the right of all peoples to self-determination and which also guarantees the full realization of human and minority rights, the creation of democratic conditions, and the application of generally accepted European norms. We trust that the tension in Yugoslavia will in no way adversely affect the Hungarian national minority living in Yugoslavia. Hungary continues to work for the further development of good-neighbourly relations and cooperation with Yugoslavia, and it will respect any democratically reached agreement on the future of Yugoslavia.”7
That position was set forth in detail in two, partly identical letters sent by the prime minister to President George H. Bush and to Prime Minister Jacques Santer of Luxembourg, who was then the President of the EC.
“I am sure you share our deep concern about the situation in Yugoslavia. My government, like most others in the international community, believes that some sort of a Yugoslavian formation is strongly desirable. We have a special reason for holding this view: there are half a million Hungarians living in Yugoslavia, most of them in the province of Vojvodina, whose autonomous status was last year suspended by the Serbians. In case of the total break-up of Yugoslavia there would emerge a nationalist, Communist, post-Titoist Great Serbia, where – I have the fear – the rights of the Hungarian and other minorities wouldn’t be respected very much. I am very pleased that there seems to exist an agreement along these lines between the State Department and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as reflected in the recent talks between Secretary of State Baker and Foreign Minister Jeszenszky, and further confirmed on the phone between the latter and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger. I highly appreciate these exchanges of views.
But there must be, there is an alternative to civil war and/or the emergence of a post-Communist state in South-Eastern Europe that might be a rallying point for all orthodox-military groupings in our region. We in Hungary think that it is both possible and desirable to create a confederation of sovereign states, a Yugoslav Commonwealth. It seems to me that all moderate elements in Yugoslavia, including Prime Minister Marković, are not averse to such a solution. As I have emphasized to Mr. Marković in our phone conversation yesterday, in our view the establishment of such a Confederation should go hand-in-hand with the restoration of the autonomous status of both Kosovo and the Vojvodina, with those provinces enjoying full equality with the other constituent elements of the Confederation. […]
I would like to emphasize that it is most important to immediately start to bring about all the practical elements of the agreement of 29 June [brokered by the EC troika] and to have political dialogue between the Yugoslav republics, which has to offer a real opportunity for the republics declaring their independence to establish a new Yugoslavia with a democratic constitutional system. […]
I am of the opinion that all democratic states, especially the United States and the European Communities should make strong representations at the various organs of the federal Yugoslav government, that all uses of force should be discontinued and the escalation of the crisis should be prevented. Further on, in order to facilitate a successful political dialogue with the aim of a lasting solution, all Southern Slav factors should be strongly urged to work towards a new constitutional settlement that would ensure the sovereignty and the internal democratic structure (including the rights and autonomy of all national minorities) of all the nations in all parts of Yugoslavia.
I think it would be desirable, even before the constitutional negotiations begin, to give guarantees for Slovenia and Croatia as well as for the democratic forces of the other republics that the new association of states would be established within such a framework. It would be also of great importance that the Yugoslav People’s Army, at present without a Commander-in-Chief, should not emerge as the decisive actor in the process of political conflict management.
The measure which can be applied in order to reach these goals, I believe, are largely at the disposal of the US Government. [In the letter to J. Santer: at the disposal of the European Community.] The Republic of Hungary is ready to cooperate in working out concrete measures for the economic-financial support of Yugoslavia.”8
Antall’s interview on the subject in the Austrian newspaper Der Standard was published with the headlines: “Antall favours confederation on the lines of the Monarchy,” and “Yugoslavia cannot go on as such.”9
So far both the leaders and diplomats of the US and the EC, fearing any change in the status quo, were committed to the unity and “integrity” of Yugoslavia, and showed little or no understanding for the grievances and aims of the non-Serbs. On his visit to Hungary former US Secretary of State Kissinger told Prime Minister Antall that the West, by its overlong insistence on the unity of Yugoslavia, bore serious responsibility for the use of force by the Yugoslav Army. The Hungarian Prime Minister agreed, adding that Croatia and Slovenia should have coordinated their steps, which they failed to do. He called for strong western pressure to stop the use of force. If Moscow, too, would join in such pressure, the chances would greatly improve, but given the current tendencies in the Soviet Union such moves were unlikely.10 The action of the Serb-led Army against Slovenia led to the first shift in the attitude of the international community, primarily by Germany and Austria. The decision taken in mid-July to send military observers from Italy and the Netherlands was seen as the internationalization of the conflict, but the observers hardly went beyond Zagreb, stayed away from the real trouble-spots, and tended to lean towards their colleagues-in-arms, the Serb military.11
When I paid a brief visit to Washington on 18–19 July I found that the attitude towards the Yugoslav crisis had changed significantly. Vice President Dan Quayle, acting for the President, received me for half an hour and showed much interest in my views on Yugoslavia. He agreed on the importance of giving due attention to the problem of national minorities if the crisis was to be solved. I had 90 minutes of talks with Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, mainly again on Yugoslavia. He knew the country very well having served there first in a junior post and from 1977 to 1980 as Ambassador. He had the reputation of being a partisan of the Serbs (“Lawrence of Serbia”), but in our several encounters he did not show such a bias at all. He was pessimistic about the future of Yugoslavia, including the consequences of the likely break-up, but was understanding towards the predicament of Hungary on account of the Hungarian minority in the Vojvodina, and promised not to lose sight of their difficulties.12
The regional cooperation of Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia and Hungary (“Quadrangolare”) was launched in 1988 as an effort to overcome the constraints presented by hostile military-political blocs. With the removal of the Iron Curtain its function increased and with Czechoslovakia and Poland it was renamed Hexagonale. At the end of July the prime ministers of the cooperation (including federal Yugoslav Premier Marković, and the leaders of Croatia and Slovenia) met at Dubrovnik, the pearl of the Croatian-Dalmatian coast. Prime Minister Antall handled the delicate situation in a masterly way: he avoided blaming any side, was in line with the well-meaning words of the EC, while emphasizing the interests both of Hungary and the Hungarian minorities in the Yugoslav republics.
“Here in this town we express our solidarity with the peoples of Yugoslavia and our desire to provide support for the peoples, nations and nationalities of the Yugoslav republics to settle their internal conflicts in a peaceful and democratic way.
Together with you, we are inevitably concerned about the escalation of violence. We regard the successful stabilisation of Yugoslavia in these three months, during the period of the moratorium, as being absolutely important. […] Our declarations so far have also expressed our view about the right of self-determination of nations and peoples, and about supporting a peaceful solution. We consider it very important that there would not be uncontrollable armies, uncontrollable military forces in our region, as I had already referred to in my speech at the Paris summit last November. We regard as vital that military forces should be withdrawn and not act contrary to the political order and settlement. […]
Therefore, it is very important to guarantee democracy, tolerance and human rights and to succeed in finding a solution acceptable for all parties. When we talked about the idea of the confederation of sovereign republics and when we expressed our view in that respect, it was always in accordance with international agreements, the Brioni Agreement.
We think that the Yugoslav government delegation here and Prime Minister Marković have taken on a superhuman task to find a solution to the crisis in this three-month period, and we believe that both moral and political support must be given to the Yugoslav federal government to enable it to perform this task. However, it can only do that if, in accordance with the Constitution of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav State Presidency monitors and controls the military steps and prevents the independent activity of irregular armed groups, and if it is able to meet the expectations of the member republics of Yugoslavia, providing the necessary guarantees to the republics for them to feel secure. We regard guarantees as vital so that the member republics would not fear or be threatened by either irregular or regular military intervention. The European Union, the family of peoples, and we in Hexagonale must do our best to support a process whereby, whatever way and whatever solution is chosen in Yugoslavia, it would take place in a democratic and constitutional manner, and whereby the federal government of Yugoslavia would be able to use these three months for implementing it. But this is obviously possible only if there is a democratic change and a pluralistic political system, and if the right of self-determination of nations, minority rights and general human rights are in place. […] if no results are achieved in the period of the three-month moratorium the consequences would be catastrophic. Therefore these three months represent a joint responsibility for all of us, not only for Yugoslavia and its member republics. So we are asking our Yugoslav friends to regard our concern and the expression of our worries not as unauthorised interference but as the manifestation of solidarity and support.”13
The major points raised in the speech were included in a letter the Hungarian Prime Minister sent to President Mitterrand of France on 1 August. Antall added: “The realization of these tasks [successful negotiations during the three month moratorium, and bringing both the regular and the irregular forces under political control] make it indispensable that the major political forces of the Serbian Republic should be given a very firm and unambiguous inducement for arranging the conditions necessary for the negotiations, and for conducting democratic and peaceful talks aiming at the reconciliation of interests. That should come from the President of the French Republic, who commands enormous respect among them. With that the readiness of Croatia, Slovenia and the other republics for negotiations would also be strengthened.” Antall also requested Mitterrand’s help protecting the Hungarian villages in eastern Croatia under attack by the Serbs, by extending the mandate of the EC observers to their areas of settlement. A call for European peace-keeping forces concluded the appeal.14 A letter of similar content was sent to President Bush on the same day. It acknowledged the President’s letter of 19 July which attests to the interest and concern shown by the US and its President towards the events in Central and Eastern Europe including the crisis in Yugoslavia.15 Antall’s message emphasized his conviction that the protection of the Hungarians in Croatia and in Serbia would contribute to the resolution of the overall Yugoslav crisis, while guarantees for safeguarding the rights of the national minorities would enhance overall security in Europe.16
On the following day I turned to Hans Van den Broek, the Dutch foreign minister, who was then the President of the Council of Ministers of the EC. With him I already had friendly personal relations, based on our earlier meetings, and he showed much interest in the problems of the post-Communist countries. My letter repeated much of what Antall had written on the previous day, informing him also about my own talks in Dubrovnik with President Tudjman, Federal Foreign Minister Lončar and Slovenia’s Foreign Minister Rupel. I was more specific about “the escalation of violent actions, and the fate of the defenceless settlements in the Croatian Republic populated by Hungarians,” referring to a delegation of elected representatives of those settlements whom I had received in Budapest not long before. I informed my colleague how the Serb irregulars were forcing the Hungarian and Croatian inhabitants to flee, replacing them with Serb settlers, thus changing the ethnic composition of their territory. In an appendix I forwarded the requests of the Hungarian communities of Croatia under military attack by regular and irregular Serb units. They called on the observers of the EC to expand their activities to the Hungarian settlements, and to press the Yugoslav government to disarm the Serb guerrilla troops. The Hungarian mayors requested the establishment of a neutral zone at the eastern border of Croatia, and asked the government of Hungary to recognize the sovereignty of Croatia immediately.17
(The author, a historian, served as Foreign Minister of Hungary in 1990–94.)
1 Kocsis Károly: Egy felrobbant etnikai mozaik esete [The case of an exploded ethnic mosaic]. Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 1993. p. 37.
2 For the little-known details of the various concepts and secret talks see: Meier, Viktor: Yugoslavia. A History of Its Demise. Transl. by Sabrina Ramet. London and New York: Routledge, 1999. p. 163.; Juhász József: Volt egyszer egy Jugoszlávia. A délszláv állam története. [Once upon a time there was a Yugoslavia. The History of the Southern Slav State] Budapest: Aula Kiadó, 1999. pp. 216-226.
3 Former Croatian Minister of Defense Martin Špegelj wrote in his memoirs (Sjećanje Vojnika [Memories of a Soldier], 2001) that he managed to buy weapons for defending Croatia against a likely Serbian attack from several countries, including Hungary. A suspiciously one-sided Serbian web-site, Balkan Strategic Studies gives very specific figures for the sale of various weapons and other war materials, “funded and organized by Germany,” and details of shipments by Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Poland, Romania, Chile and Hungary. (http://18.104.22.168/ISSA/reports/Balkan/Oct3192.htm) During my term as minister I did receive information about arms deliveries to the various parties in Yugoslavia by a number of countries in late 1991 and in 1992, but I have no knowledge about additional Hungarian weapons given or sold to Croatia after October 1990. My Government was certainly not aware of any. After the all-out war was started by the Serb-led Yugoslav People’s Army against Croatia in August 1991 and an international embargo was declared on the sale of weapons to any of the units of the onetime Yugoslavia, Hungary did it best to enforce it. It is well-known that the embargo was not kept by a large number of countries, often selling weapons to both sides. Cf. János Jakus: “A Horvát Hadsereg felszabadító hadműveletei 1995-ben” [The military campaigns for liberation by the Croatian Army in 1995], Balkán füzetek Különszám I., Pécs, 2009. p. 37.
4 The precariousness of the situation for Hungary was recognized and understood by Christopher Cviic: Remaking the Balkans. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991. pp. 98-99.
5 This summary is based on my copy of the Hungarian translation of text which appeared in the 31 January issue of Borba and Vjesnik, sent to the Foreign Ministry of Hungary.
6 The details of the talks, negotiations, intrigues, threats in the first half of 1991, based on intimate sources, interviews and memoirs is told by Meier, op. cit., pp. 157-174.
7 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Situation in Yugoslavia, 28 June, 1991. My copy.
8 Prime Minister Antall to President George Bush, and to Prime Minister Jacques Santer, 30 June, 1991. My copy of the English original.
9 Der Standard, 3 July, 1991.
10 The summary report on Henry Kissinger’s visit (30 June–3 July, 1991) is in my possession.
11 Reports from the Hungarians in the Slavonian district of Croatia, under the attack of Serb irregulars openly supported by the Yugoslav Army, proved that. Meier, op. cit., 224. corroborates the charge.
12 Report on my talks in Washington on 18 and 19 July, drawn up by the Embassy of Hungary. My copy.
13 Prime Minister Antall’s speech at the Hexagonale Summit in Dubrovnik, 27 July, 1991. Antall, József: Selected Speeches and Interviews. Ed. by Géza Jeszenszky. Budapest: József Antall Foundation, 2008. pp. 263-264.
14 Prime Minister Antall to President Mitterand Of France, 1 August, 1991. My copy (in Hungarian).
15 President Bush’s letter is not included in my collection of documents.
16 Prime Minister Antall to President George Bush, 1 August, 1991. My copy (in Hungarian).
17 Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky to Foreign Minister Hans Van den Broek, 2 August, 1991. My copy of the English original.